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FIRST DO NO HARM: INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION TO EXCLUDE HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
 
JOSHUA L. ROOT 
 
ABSTRACT: 
The yet to be implemented Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute 
criminalizes, as the crime of aggression, acts of aggression which by 
their “character, gravity and scale” constitute a “manifest violation” of 
the Charter of the United Nations. This article argues that Article 8 bis 
must be construed so as to exclude from the International Criminal 
Court’s jurisdiction uses of force, which are facial violations of the UN 
Charter, but which nonetheless comport with the principles and 
purposes of the Charter, such as bona fide humanitarian intervention 
unauthorized by the Security Council. This article examines and applies 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state practice, and 
opinion juris to conclude that such humanitarian intervention is not a 
use of force per se prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, despite 
widespread belief to the contrary. Even if Article 2(4) prohibits bona 
fide humanitarian interventions, humanitarian interventions will not 
be—by their “character, gravity and scale”—“manifest” violations of 
the UN Charter, and therefore are not crimes within the competency of 
the International Criminal Court to punish. 
 
Abstract: 
Joshua L. Root is a Lieutenant J.G. in the U.S. Navy, JAG Corps. He is 
licensed to practice law in Florida and is a returned Peace Corps 
Volunteer (Cambodia 2007-2009). He has his J.D. from the University 
of Florida and his L.L.M. from the University of Edinburgh in the UK.  
He wrote this article in his own capacity.  The views here are not 
necessary the views of the U.S. Government. 
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More and more, we all confront difficult questions 
about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by 
their own government, or to stop a civil war whose 
violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. I 
believe that force can be justified on humanitarian 
grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places 
that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our 
conscience and can lead to more costly intervention 
later. 
--President Barack Obama upon receipt of    




On June 12, 2010, the States Parties to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) meeting in Kampala, Uganda 
adopted by consensus a new Article 8 bis for the Rome Statute.2 Doing 
so, they defined the crime of aggression for the purposes of the ICC’s 
statute and addressed the Court’s future jurisdiction over that crime.3 
Article 8 bis (1) defines “the crime of aggression” as: 
      
                                                     
1 Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture by Barack H. Obama: A Just and 
Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-
lecture_en.html. 
2 See generally Matthew Gillett, The Anatomy of an International 
Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court, 13 INT’L CRIM. 
L. R 829 (2013). 
3See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, May 31-Jun. 11, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
R/Con./Res.6 [hereinafter RC/Res.6]; see also Robert Heinsch, The 
Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the 
Future?, GOETTINGEN J. INT’L. L. 713, 715 (2010). Thirty member 
States must ratify Article 8 bis and the Member States must take further 
action after January 1, 2017 before the ICC can assert jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 8 bis, 15 bis(2-3), 15 ter, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].The decision by the Member States to 
confer on the Court this jurisdiction must be taken by the same majority 
which is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute. As 
of this writing, only five states have now ratified the Article 8 bis 
amendment. See UN Treaty Collection, 2013-04-11. 
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[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution, 
by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.4 
 
Article 8 bis (2) defines “act of aggression” as, “the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”5 Article 8 then 
specifies examples of acts of aggression.6 Undefined terms such as 
“character,” “gravity,” “scale,” and “manifest” at first appear 
ambiguous. Properly construed, however, these terms exclude bona fide 
humanitarian intervention from the scope of the crime.7 Beth Van 
Schaack has argued that: 
  
The crime of aggression is expansively drafted in a 
way that implicates all uses of force that might be 
construed to constitute a ‘manifest’ violation of the 
U.N. Charter . . . As a result, the codification of the 
crime of aggression and the eventual threat of 
prosecution may chill those uses of force that are 
protective in nature, such as interventions pursuant to 
                                                     
4 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8 bis(1). 
5 Id. at art. 8 bis(2). 
6 See id. at art. 8 bis(2)(a)-(g) (these acts include invasion, 
bombardment, blockade, etc.) 
7 See Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian 
Intervention on Behalf of Women, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 477, 491 
(2011). (“[S]ome elements that would be required for any valid 
intervention . . . include: action by a legitimate authority; pursuit of a 
right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil); 
abuses that exceed some gravity threshold; the use of force as a last 
resort after efforts at diplomacy, negotiation and other sanctions had 
failed; a proportional response; and a reasonable prospect of success. In 
terms of legitimate power, a prioritising of Security Council action, or 
at a minimum multilateral or regional action, is a central feature of 
modern theorising about humanitarian intervention . . . [a]n additional 
requirement would be that such an intervention would result in the 
diminution rather than escalation of violence.”). 
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the nascent doctrine of responsibility to protect [and 
humanitarian intervention.]8  
 
This article shows that a reading of Article 8 bis construing 
humanitarian intervention as a crime before the ICC is unwarranted and 
unwise. Part I of this article argues that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
should be interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) in light of the UN Charter’s 
human rights provisions, especially Articles 1, 55, 56, and the 
Preamble.9 By doing so, it becomes tenable to interpret Article 2(4) so 
as not to proscribe bona fide acts of humanitarian intervention per se. 
Part II examines Article 8 bis and shows that excluding humanitarian 
intervention from the crime of aggression is fully warranted by the 
Rome Statue, and is even required by its terms. In order for a violation 
of the UN Charter to be a crime under Article 8 bis it must be a 
manifest violation.10 This threshold excludes uses of force, such as 
humanitarian interventions, that may be facial violations of the UN 
Charter, but which nonetheless comport with its principles.11 Further, 
this article will show that the qualifiers “character” and “gravity” must 
be construed so as to exclude humanitarian intervention from the crime 
of aggression’s scope, thereby precluding humanitarian intervention 
from being a manifest violation of the UN Charter. A discussion of 
nullum crimen sine lege and a conclusion follows. 
 
II. INTERPRETING THE UN CHARTER’S PROHIBITION OF 
THE USE OF FORCE 
 
Humanitarian intervention is “the use of armed force for the 
prevention or discontinuation of massive violations of human rights in 
a foreign State.”12 The crime of aggression requires an act of aggression 
                                                     
8 Id. at 478-79. 
9 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art. 
1, art. 55, art. 56. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 130 
(BRUNO SIMMA ed., 2nd ed., 2002) (citing Michael Reisman & Myres 
S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 167-96, 
178, 192-93 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); see Michael Reisman, 
Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM 
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which in turn necessitates the use of force.13 Any discussion on the 
legality of the use of force, including force used for humanitarian 
purposes, begins with the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force 
contained in Article 2(4); however, this must not end there. That article 
provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”14 There are two provisions 
where the UN Charter expressly authorizes the use of force despite 
Article 2(4). The first is force used in self-defense (Article 51) and the 
second is the use of force pursuant to a Security Council resolution 
under its Chapter VII (Articles 43-48) powers.15 There is no provision 
specifically addressing humanitarian intervention, and at first blush, the 
two explicit exceptions appear to be the only lawful uses of force under 
the UN Charter framework. Upon closer examination; however, it 
becomes clear that not all other uses of force are per se prohibited by 
Article 2(4) or any other provision.16 Unlike self-defense, the argument 
                                                                                                          
INT’L. L. J. 794, 794-805 (1995); see Michael Reisman, Sovereignty 
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. 
INT'L. L. 866, 866-76 (1990); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 18 (J.L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (defining humanitarian intervention as 
“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations 
of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own 
citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force 
is applied.”); see also Gillett, supra note 2, at 851 quoting SEAN D. 
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN 
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11-12 (1996) (defining humanitarian 
intervention as “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or 
international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the 
nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of 
internationally recognized human rights.”).  
13 See generally Reisman & McDougal, supra note 12 at 192-93.  
14 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
15 See id. arts. 39-51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ”) Id. art. 51. 
16 But see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 
72 (5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he Charter forbids the use of inter-State force, 
except in the exercise of self-defence or as a measure of collective 
security decided upon by the Security Council, [and] any professed 
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here is not that humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized by 
the UN Charter; rather, the argument is simply that humanitarian 
intervention is not prohibited. Since states are free to engage in any 
conduct they wish so long as it does not violate a proscription of 
international law, that is all which must be proven.17  
 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, which is 
customary international law, the UN Charter is a treaty and is thus 
subject to the rules of treaty interpretation.18 The Vienna Convention 
provides that provisions of a statute should be interpreted with 
“ordinary meaning . . . given to the term[s]” in the text.19 The terms of 
Article 2(4) seem clear enough, but as International Court of Justice 
(ICJ or World Court) Judge Simma explained, “[t]he ordinary meaning 
of a term can only be determined by looking at the context in which it 
is used.”20 The ICJ emphasized this point in the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) advisory opinion.21 The 
relevant context of Article 2(4) is that it is contained in the UN Charter, 
itself a human rights document (drafted as the full magnitude of the 
                                                                                                          
dispensation from this prohibition would be contradictory to the 
Charter.”). 
17 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 
(Sept. 7), (“Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot 
therefore be presumed.”). 
18 VCLT, supra note 9, at  art. 2(1)(a) (“‘[T]reaty’ means an 
international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation”); see also Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. 
Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 72 (May 23) (Where the ICJ applied the Vienna 
Convention to the dispute, even though neither state party was a 
member of the convention, because the convention reflects customary 
international law; see also, Frequently Asked Questions About Vienna 
Convention on Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.   
19 VCLT, supra note 9, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
20 SIMMA, supra note 12, at 20. 
21 See Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, 
1960 I.C.J. 150, 158-60 (June 8). 
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Holocaust was coming to light), and must be read in that context.22 
Human rights are expressly provided for in Articles 55 and 56. UN 
Charter Article 55 states that “the United Nations shall promote . . . 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all . . . .”23 Article 56 further provides that “[a]ll Members 
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with 
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55.”24  
 
Further, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that 
treaty provisions “shall [be interpreted in] light of [the treaty’s] object 
and purpose.”25 This is a crucial point often missed by strict 
constructionists. “Shall” indicates an imperative; it is not optional.26 
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention then explains that the object 
and purpose of a treaty are determined, inter alia, by looking at the 
treaty’s preamble.27 The preamble of the UN Charter provides that its 
members “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . .”28 In his 
dissent to the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, ICJ Judge 
Weeramantry noted that “dignity and worth of the human person” are 
keynote principles of the UN Charter.29 More palpably, UN Charter 
Article I reads: “The Purposes of the United Nations Are [the 
achievement of] (3) “international co-operation in solving international 
problems of . . . humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all . . . .”30  
 
                                                     
22 See Katarina Mansson, Reviving the ‘Spirit of San Francisco’: The 
Lost Proposals on Human Rights, Justice and International Law to the 
UN Charter, 6 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 217 (2007). 
23 U.N. Charter art. 55. 
24 U.N. Charter art. 56. 
25 VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 31(1). 
26 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the 
verb “shall” as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . This is 
the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts 
typically uphold.”).  
27 VCLT, supra note 9, at art. 31(2). 
28 U.N. Charter pmbl. 
29 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 441-42 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry). 
30 U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3.  
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Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, the provisions of the UN 
Charter (including Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force) must 
be interpreted in conformity with the purposes of the UN Charter. 
These purposes specifically include the promotion and protection of 
human rights. Commentators support this position;31 additionally, so do 
the terms within the UN Charter. It is important to note that Article 2(4) 
speaks of conduct inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter, not 
necessarily with the provisions of the Charter.32 Additionally, under the 
doctrine of effet-utile when a treaty provision is subject to multiple 
interpretations, “the one that best serves the recognizable purposes of 
the treaty and its various provisions must be chosen.”33 In his dissenting 
opinion in the ICJ’s South-West Africa advisory opinion, Judge de 
Visscher made it clear that this principle is applicable to the UN 
Charter: 
 
It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty 
clauses must not only be considered as a whole, but 
must also be interpreted as to avoid as much as 
possible depriving one of them of practical effect for 
the benefit of others. This rule is particularly 
applicable to the interpretation of a text of a treaty of 
a constitutional character like the United Nations 
Charter.34  
 
Article 2(4) cannot be interpreted to abrogate the very purposes of the 
Charter, especially its human rights provisions, or to deprive Articles 1, 
55, 56 and the Preamble of any meaning. Therefore, the article cannot 
be construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary 
                                                     
31 See e.g., Keith A. Petty. Criminalizing Force: Resolving the 
Threshold Question for the Crime of Aggression in the Context of 
Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 105, 125 (2009); Michael 
Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and 
Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 78 (2007-
2009). 
32 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
33 See SIMMA, supra note 12, at 31.  
34 International Status of Southwest Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 
I.C.J., 187 (July 11) (dissenting opinion of Judge De Visscher); see 
also, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of The United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J.,174 (April 11). 
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to enforce the principles of the Charter even if force is unauthorized by 
the Security Council.  
 
There is ample support for the position that a customary rule 
of international law allowing for just uses of force under Article 2(4) 
has emerged.35 The General Assembly carved out an exception for 
aggression in Resolution 3314, when it defined aggression for the 
purposes of assisting the Security Council in interpreting the UN 
Charter.36 Although adopted by consensus, the General Assembly does 
not legislate, and therefore Resolution 3314 is not binding on the 
Security Council.37 However, the importance for this resolution cannot 
be ignored. General Assembly resolutions can have great normative 
effect and at a minimum, Resolution 3314 is expectation-forming and 
evidence of opinio juris.38 Crucially, Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute 
explicitly incorporates Resolution 3314 making it part of the governing 
law of the ICC.39 Article 6 of Resolution 3314 states that “[n]othing in 
this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or 
diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., Fernando R. Tesón, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 2, 42-48 
(2009); Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian 
Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 605-632 (2001). 
36 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3314]. 
37 See Yoram Dinstein, Aggression in THE MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 
2012). 
38 See e.g., Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law 
in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L. J. 876, (1983) (for more on how 
General Assembly resolutions can create soft-law); Tullio Treves, 
Customary International Law, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 937, 946 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012); 
Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICJ, 16 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. no. 5, 879, 879-906 (2005). 
39 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 5 (stating, “Any of the following 
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression . . . ”). 
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concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”40 However, the 
resolution also explains that its provisions on the definition of 
aggression are “interrelated and each provision should be construed in 
the context of the other provisions.”41 Therefore, Article 6 must be read 
alongside Article 7, which effectively endorses the use of force in 
support of wars of national liberation and the right of self-
determination.42 Article 7 of the consensus definition of aggression 
states:  
 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3 
[giving examples of aggressive conduct, which has 
been reproduced in Article 8 bis], could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and 
independence, as derived from the Charter, of 
peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes 
or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of 
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and 
receive support in accordance with the principles of 
the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.43  
 
The point here is that Resolution 3314—and therefore Article 
8 bis—endorses a use of force, at least in some circumstances that are 
not provided for in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) is not a shibboleth. As 
reasoned by the General Assembly in the consensus definition of 
aggression, there are times when the use of force not in self-defense, 
and not under the aegis of the Security Council, may nevertheless be 
lawful.44 
 
Professor Yoram Dinstein argues that “[p]ursuant to the 
Charter, the Security Council—and the Security Council alone—is 
legally competent to undertake or to authorize forcible ‘humanitarian 
                                                     
40 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at 144.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at art. 7; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.  
43 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 7 (emphasis added); see also 
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 71-72.  
44 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 72.  
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intervention.’”45 Ironically, this ignores the fact that Chapter VII does 
not provide for humanitarian intervention. Chapter VII does not confer 
onto the Security Council the power to authorize force to prevent 
massive human rights violations or to initiate regime change. Instead, it 
empowers the Security Council to authorize, or compel, military 
interventions in the cases of threats to peace, breaches of peace, and 
acts of aggression—conflicts between states—but only so as to “restore 
international peace and security.”46 This grant of authority is narrow. It 
is Chapter VI, not VII, which vests the Security Council with broad 
powers to address human rights violations internal to states but of 
international concern.47 Chapter VI, however, addresses the “pacific” 
settlement of conflicts and limits the Security Council’s powers of 
addressing these matters to undertaking investigations and making 
recommendations.48 Nothing in Chapter VI speaks to the authorization 
of force. When writers like Dinstein argue that the only lawful form of 
humanitarian intervention is that which is enforced under a Chapter VII 
mandate, they have already read into the Charter an exception to 
Article 2(4).49 This interpretation of Chapter VII is fully warranted, 
however, because it gives effect to the principals and purposes of the 
UN Charter.   
 
Moreover, as Slye and Van Schaack note, “it is generally 
accepted at the international level that treaties are to be treated as living 
documents. In other words, they are to be interpreted in the context of 
the time in which they are being applied, and not as they would have 
been interpreted at the time of their drafting.”50 The UN Charter must 
                                                     
45 Id. at 94. See also id. at 73 (Arguing that “[n]othing in the Charter of 
the United Nations substantiates a unilateral right of one State to use 
force against another under the guise of securing the implementation of 
human rights”); SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131 (stating “Under the UN 
Charter, forcible humanitarian intervention can no longer, therefore, be 
considered lawful”).  
46 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
47 Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses the “pacific settlement of 
disputes.” U.N. Charter art. 33. 
48 U.N. Charter arts. 34, 36. 
49 See note 43, infra. 
50 RONALD C. SLYE AND BETH VAN SCHAACK, ESSENTIALS: 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2009); see also IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 (7th ed., 2008) 
(“[T]he language of the treaty must be interpreted in the light of the 
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be read in light of state practice, contemporary notions of sovereignty 
and opinio juris, such as that provided by the General Assembly with 
the nascent Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P).51 The UN Charter, 
in fact, anticipates the continued development of international law. The 
Preamble provides that an additional purpose of the Charter is “to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained.”52 The R2P norm, which is one of those other sources, 
having emerged in the last decades, holds that states have a 
fundamental duty to protect their people from serious and systematic 
human rights abuses.53 The General Assembly, offering strong evidence 
of opinion juris, explained that, “each individual state has the 
responsibility to protect [people] from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . through appropriate and 
necessary means.”54 Pursuant to this doctrine, “if a state cannot or will 
not prevent the occurrence of such abuses, then intervention by other 
actors in the international community, including through the use of 
force, is justified, subject to certain limitations.”55 Many states embrace 
this principle. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
which entered into force in 2001, provides that the Union has a “right . . 
. to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.”56 The “Assembly” noted in this provision is 
                                                                                                          
rules of general international law in force at the time of its conclusion, 
and also in the light of the contemporaneous meaning of terms.”). 
51 See generally G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 
2009); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 99 (2007); Int’l Comm’n on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, at 11; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶¶ 201-03, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/2, ¶¶ 138-9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 
24, 2005); Paul Williams and Michael Scharf, NATO Intervention on 
Trial: The Legal Case that was Never Made, Human Rights Review 
1(2): 103, at 105. 
52 U.N. Charter pmbl.  
53 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).   
54 Id.  
55 Gillett, supra note 2, at 851. 
56 Organization of African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
July 1, 2000, art. 4, ¶ h.  
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composed of the heads of state of the African Union constituency, and 
not the Security Council.57 Since the African Union Constitutive Act 
evidently takes “due account of the Charter of the United Nations,” the 
fifty-three African states which agreed to this document believe that 
humanitarian intervention and R2P are compatible with the UN Charter 
in the absence of a Security Council resolution.58   
 
It must be conceded that the ICJ has held in several instances 
that forcible humanitarian intervention, without Security Council 
authorization is unlawful.59 In the Nicaragua case, the court held that 
the use of force was not an appropriate means of addressing human 
rights violations in the Central American state.60 The ICJ further held in 
the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that there were only two 
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force: self-defense and that 
pursuant to Ch. VII authorization.61 In the DRC case, the court noted 
that despite the atrocities ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Uganda was not authorized to use military force within the 
DRC.62 On the other hand, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo, the ICJ held that States are obligated “to employ all means 
reasonably available to them so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible”63 The bona fide nature of the humanitarian interventions in 
both Nicaragua and DRC were dubious. If a case were to come before 
the World Court whose facts more strongly suggested the humanitarian 
intervention was invoked in good faith, the ICJ might rule very 
differently. Indeed, the ICJ had the opportunity to reiterate the 
                                                     
57 Id. at art. 1 (“‘Assembly’” means the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Union”). 
58 See id. at pmbl, art. 3, (listing the heads of State adopting the 
Constitutive Act in 2000). 
59 Petty, supra note 31, at 121. 
60 See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 
Merits, Judgments (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 146-49 (June 27); 
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 74 (citing N.S. Rodley, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INTL. 
& COMP. L.Q. 321, 332 (1989)).  
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, 266 (July 8). 
62 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, 2000 I.C.J. 124-25 (July 1). 
63 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 221, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26). 
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(perceived) incompatibility of humanitarian intervention with the UN 
Charter in the Kosovo advisory opinion and chose not to.64  
 
Moreover, Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force must 
be considered in light of state practice. In 1990, a West African 
peacekeeping force—under the auspices of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS)—was militarily involved in Liberia 
without Chapter VII Security Council authorization.65 The UN did not 
condemn the action and member states largely applauded the 
intervention.66 The Security Council even adopted a resolution 
commending the effort and affirming its support.67 This favorable 
treatment can be largely explained by the humanitarian purposes of the 
intervention and the ongoing civil war in Liberia that was resulting in 
large-scale human rights atrocities.68 ECOWAS again intervened in 
Sierra Leone in 1997 without Chapter VII authorization, with much the 
same result.69 Most notably, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for a period of 
seventy-eight days in 1999 without a Security Council mandate, an 
action unrelated to self-defense.70 The United States-led NATO 
bombing of the former Yugoslavia was intended to protect the 
repressed ethnic Albanian population in the Kosovo province from an 
“overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”71 Again, the UN did not 
                                                     
64 See Accordance with International Law of Unilateral  
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,  
2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22). 
65 See generally Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile, The Legality of ECOWAS 
Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 381 (1994). 
66 Id. 
67 See Kofi Oteng Kufour, Developments in the Resolution of the 
Liberian Conflict, 10:1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 384, (1994); 
see also S.C. Res. 788, ¶12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 18, 1992). 
68 See generally REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS (M. Weller, ed.1994).  
69 See generally Daniel Doktori, Minding the Gap: International Law 
and Regional Enforcement in Sierra Leone, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 329 
(2008). 
70 BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 742. 
71 As the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir 
Jeremy Greenstock, put it in March 24th 1999: “The action being taken 
is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances 
in Kosovo there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is 
imminent. . . Every means short of force has been tried to avert this 
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condemn the campaign, though admittedly, it was not uncontroversial.72 
State practice is actually much more consistent and widespread than 
these few examples suggest. For example, Russia, one of the 
archetypical states trumpeting the uncompromising language of Article 
2(4), nonetheless invoked humanitarian intervention when it intervened 
                                                                                                          
situation . . . military intervention is legally justifiable . . . .” quoted in 
BROWNLIE, id. at 743; See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1156 (6th ed.) (2008); UKMIL, 70 British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1999, p. 586, where the UK Secretary of State for 
Defense stated, “In international law, in exceptional circumstances and 
to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, military action can be taken and it 
is on that legal basis that military action was taken.” 
72 See Mary E. O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is 
Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. 
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 189, 202-03 (2012) (referencing, Bruno Simma, 
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International 
Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002)); See also, SHAW, 
supra note 71, at 1157; Gillett, supra note 2, at 851; BROWNLIE, supra 
note 50, at 744 (noting a “Ministerial Declaration produced by the 
meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 held in New York on 
24 September 1999, three months after the NATO action against 
Yugoslavia had ended.” There, the “Ministers stressed the need to 
maintain clear distinctions between humanitarian assistance and other 
activities of the United Nations. They rejected the so-called right of 
humanitarian intervention, which has no basis in the UN Charter or 
international law.”). Id. at 744; See also DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 
338 (stating, the “[f]ailure by the Council to act in the face of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in Kosovo was distressing. Still, the ‘cure’ for that failure – 
opening the sluices for unilateral forcible intervention in a manner 
wreaking havoc on the Charter’s system prohibiting the use of inter-
State force save for self-defense or collective security – appears to the 
present writer worse than the disease.” He further states that “[t]he 
question whether the situation in Kosovo in 1999 was so agonizing hat 
it warranted humanitarian intervention from the outside should have 
been resolved by the Security Council and not unilaterally by 
NATO.”). 
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in Georgia in 2008.73 The fact that few observers would find this 
conduct to be an example of bona fide humanitarian intervention does 
nothing to refute the fact that even Russia believes unauthorized 
humanitarian intervention may be lawful in some circumstances. Some 
commentators worry that if humanitarian intervention is deemed lawful 
it will be raised as a convenient excuse by states to advance their own 
political agendas.74 “The pitfall,” Dinstein writes, in granting license to 
unauthorized humanitarian intervention, “is that there can be 
countervailing subjective opinions as to whether a course of action is 
just, and there is too much room for abuse of the law in the name of 
justice.”75 These concerns are valid. To address those concerns, the 
international community and the court can apply rigorous guidelines 
clarifying which forms of humanitarian intervention will be treated as 
unlawful and which will not be, rather than sticking to the dogmatism 
that Article 2(4) is absolute. More exacting guidelines, either offered 
through judicial decisions of the court or through the Elements of 
Crimes, on the meaning of “character” in Article 8 bis would be an 
appropriate way of addressing these concerns (see below). 
 
In sum, Article 2(4) must be interpreted so as not to 
undermine the principles of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) cannot be 
construed to prohibit bona fide humanitarian intervention necessary to 
prevent massive human rights atrocities from being perpetrated. A state 
cannot engage in massive human rights violations in contravention of 
the UN Charter’s principles, and then, with unclean hands, invoke that 
very same Charter to argue that its political independence and territorial 
integrity–necessary to continue committing human rights atrocities–are 
offended by humanitarian interveners. Nevertheless, this issue will 
remain contentious, and for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the 
complete contours of Article 2(4) need not be resolved here. Even if 
accepting, arguendo, that UN Charter Article 2(4) cannot be 
harmonized with humanitarian intervention, it does not mean that such 
a use of force will constitute the crime of aggression. An act of 
                                                     
73 O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 206; see also Gregory 
Hafkin, Russio-Georgian War of 2008: Developing the Law of 
Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 28 B.U. INT'L 
L.J. 219 (2010). 
74 See, e.g., DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL AND 
BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2nd ed. 
2005); STEPHEN A. GARRETT, DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL: AN 
EXAMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 3 (1999). 
75 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 74. 
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aggression—an illegal use of armed force—while a necessary 
ingredient for the crime of aggression, is not sufficient to trigger the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. The Rome Statute requires more.  
 
III. MANIFEST VIOLATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER 
 
It may be superfluous to point out that the crime of aggression 
requires an act of aggression. An act of aggression, however, is not 
enough to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 8 bis.76 This 
reflects the pedigree of the consensus definition found in Resolution 
3314. Article 5(2) of that resolution states: “A war of aggression is a 
crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility.”77 The Resolution therefore differentiates “aggression” 
on the one hand, which gives rise to international state responsibility, 
and a “war of aggression” on the other, which is criminal.78 The 
General Assembly clearly signaled that not every act of aggression 
should constitute a crime, even if one believes that all acts of 
aggression violate the UN Charter. Acts of aggression that fall short of 
wars of aggression will not result in individual criminal responsibility, 
though they might trigger the rules of state responsibility (not dealt 
with here).79  
 
Where Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute defines the “crime 
of aggression,” Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of aggression.”80 The Rome 
Statute, therefore, like the consensus definition, bifurcates crimes and 
mere acts of aggression. Where Resolution 3314 delineates criminal 
conduct and state responsibility, Article 8 bis distinguishes crimes 
adjudicable by the Court and acts of aggression, which are beyond the 
Court’s jurisdiction to punish.81 Since Article 8 bis(2) defines “act of 
aggression” as a “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
                                                     
76 Gillett, supra note 2, at 855 
77 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at art. 5(2). 
78 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 135. 
79 See generally Dinstein, supra note 37, at ¶ 12; DINSTEIN, supra note 
16, at 135. For more on State responsibility, see also ILC Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC 
GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, ILC A/56/10 (2011). 
80 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 bis(2). 
81 See id., at art. 5 (The Court only has the competency to punish the 
crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. Article 5(d) speaks of the 
crime of aggression, and does not contain a provision for acts of 
aggression). 
 Journal of International Law  
81 
 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the 
“crime of aggression” must be something different.82 Not all acts of 
aggression will rise to the level of the crime of aggression. The dividing 
line between acts and crimes of aggression is provided for in Article 8 
bis.83 In order to constitute the crime of aggression under the Rome 
Statute, “as a threshold requirement” the act of aggression must “by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitute a manifest violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”84  
 
The terms in the threshold qualifier are catnip for lawyers. 
They appear ambiguous at first and are (mostly) undefined in the Rome 
Statute.85 Some commentators have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the qualifiers and plentiful ink has been spilled attempting to interpret 
the language used in this provision.86 This section spills a little more 
(“manifest” is discussed here, “character, gravity and scale” are dealt 
with in order below). As the Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage acidly 
puts it, “[t]he adjective ‘manifest’ often functions in suspect ways in 
legal writing . . . This word is one of those vague terms by which 
lawyers create an appearance of continuity, uniformity and definiteness 
that does not in fact exist.”87 Before ultimately settling on “manifest,” 
the drafters of Article 8 bis considered using “flagrant” or “serious” as 
triggering thresholds.88 Reportedly, the reason “flagrant” was not 
adopted is that it was believed the term would “establish a very high 
                                                     
82 Id. 
83 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8 bis. 
84 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW: SECOND REVISED EDITION 636 (2013) (citing Rome Statute, 
supra note 3, art. 8 bis). 
85 See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (noting that the “[d]rafters did 
not consider how these factors should be defined, leaving it to the Court 
for interpretation”). 
86 See e.g., O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 200; See G.A. 
Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 3; See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra 
note 72, at 204. 
87 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 547 
(Oxford, 2nd ed. 1995). 
88 See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204; see also, 
Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression 6, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 2006. 
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threshold, apparently too high.”89 “Manifest,” on the other hand, was 
thought to establish a threshold higher than that found in Resolution 
3314, but not too high.90 Nomenclature is a lawyer’s stock-in-trade, but 
there is probably no real difference between “flagrant” and “manifest.” 
According to the Burton Legal Thesaurus, the two words are 
synonymous.91  
 
At the Kampala Review Conference, some delegations wished 
to define “manifest violations” as “an obvious illegal violation.”92 Other 
delegations interpreted the phrase to mean “a violation with serious 
consequences.”93 A third group interpreted “manifest” to mean that the 
violation must be both obviously illegal and one with serious 
consequences.94 No interpretation was agreed upon, but commentators 
have put forward various suggestions for the meaning of “manifest.”95 
In an attempt to define the terms, Paulus refers to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which notes that manifest is “clearly revealed to the eye, 
mind or judgment; open to view or comprehension; obvious.”96 He goes 
on to state that this definition is of not much help in that, “what, after 
all is obvious for one, is completely obscure to the other, in particular 
in international law.”97 Echoing that sentiment, Potter suggests that 
“manifest” adds nothing to the definition of the crime “but confusion.”98 
                                                     
89 O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204 (quoting Stefan 
Barriga, Against the Odds: The Results of the Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression, in  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 621-43 
(Roberto Bellelli, ed., 2010). 
90 Id.  
91 See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS, 325, (Steven C. 
DeCosta, ed., Deluxe ed., 1980).  
92See Johan D. der Vyver, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the 
International Criminal Court, 1 NAT'L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2010-2011). 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of 
Aggression, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1117 (2009); Drew Kostic, Whose 
Crime is it Anyway? The International Criminal Court and the Crime 
of Aggression, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2011-2012); 
O’Connell & Niyazmatov, supra note 72.     
96 Paulus, supra note 95, at 1121. 
97 Id. 
98 O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 204. 




This is unpersuasive. There is a presumption in treaty 
interpretation that the drafting parties did not intend ambiguity, and that 
each word has been included for a reason.99 The reason the “manifest” 
language was adopted was clearly to limit the scope of the crime of 
aggression. At the Kampala Review Conference, several States leading 
the effort to include the “manifest” qualifier were involved in NATO’s 
1999 Kosovo campaign.100 Some delegates were concerned about the 
crime of aggression’s potential chilling impact on humanitarian 
interventions.101 It was, supposedly, the “elephant in the room.”102 At 
Kampala, the US delegation’s “single most sensitive proposal was on 
excluding humanitarian intervention from the scope of draft Article 8 
bis.”103 O’Connell and Niyazmatov note that other NATO States 
supported a high threshold for individual criminal responsibility, and 
that “[t]he delegations supporting the high threshold of ‘manifest’ by 
‘character, gravity and scale’ were also those advocating that the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over aggression be narrow.”104 No explicit exception for 
humanitarian intervention was agreed upon, but the “manifest” 
language was, and it must be read with the understanding that 
                                                     
99 COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 726 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.). 
100 See O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03. 
101 Id. at 202-03 (referencing Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use 
of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 
HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest 
Too Much’: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 
MOD. L. REV. 159-75 (2002)).  
102 Gillett, supra note 2, at 846. See also O’Connell & Niyazmatov, 
supra note 72, at 202 (“During the Preparatory Commission’s meeting 
in 1996, the US representative had already expressed specific concerns 
about humanitarian intervention. He tried to argue that because the 
drafters of the UN Charter did not know about humanitarian 
intervention, the ICC crime of aggression would have to specially 
provide for it.”).  
103 Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holzendorff, The Kampala Compromise 
on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1205 (2010). 
104 O’Connell and Niyazmatov, supra note 72, at 202-03. 
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humanitarian intervention is the very sort of conduct the qualifier was 
intended to exclude.105 
 
There is textual support for this argument. Although the 
“manifest” threshold is found in neither the UN Charter nor Resolution 
3314, it is elaborated upon in the Vienna Convention.106 Article 46(2) of 
the Vienna Convention states that “a violation of domestic law can be 
invoked as manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State 
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and 
in good faith.”107 That provision is used in the context of the validity of 
treaties, but the presumption is that terms should be used consistently 
unless provided for otherwise.108 “Manifest” is also used in two other 
locations of the Rome Statute.109 It is elaborated upon once. Rome 
Statute Article 33 addresses the defense of obedience to superior 
orders110. Subsection 2 explains that “orders to commit genocide or 
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.”111 This language is 
“[f]or the purposes of [Article 33]”112, but this is simply an 
                                                     
105 The American delegation attempted unsuccessfully to have the 
following understanding explicitly exclude humanitarian intervention 
adopted at Kampala: 
It is understood that, for purposes of the Statute, an 
act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of 
the United Nations Charter unless it would be 
objectively evident to any State conducting itself in 
the matter in accordance with normal practice and in 
good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection 
with an effort to prevent the commission of any of 
the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the 
Statute would not constitute an act of aggression. 
 
See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483. 
106 See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 726. 
107 VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46(2) at 343. (emphasis added). See also 
id. 
108 VCLT, supra note 9, art. 46 at 343; see also, id. at art. 31(1) at 340 
(“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
109 Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 33(1)(c)(2), 85(3). 
110 Id. art. 33. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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acknowledgement that such orders can never reasonably be interpreted 
as lawful.113 “Manifest” is used here as a reasonableness standard and 
there is no indication that it should be used any differently in Article 8 
bis.114 In fact, the Elements of Crimes, adopted contemporaneously with 
Article 8 bis, states: “The term ‘manifest’ is an objective 
qualification.”115 Objectivity is applied by the reasonableness standard: 
what a typical person in the actor’s circumstance would understand to 
be reasonable behavior is objectively reasonable as a matter of law.116    
 
It is the position here that interpreting the UN Charter so as to 
allow bona fide humanitarian intervention in the face of serious human 
rights atrocities is reasonable, despite the lack of Security Council 
authorization even if it is in technical violation.117 If it is not a manifest 
violation, it is not criminal.118 According to the late Cassese, “[t]he 
requirement of ‘manifest’ violations of the UN Charter excludes 
borderline or gray-area cases in an area of law with a lot of blurry 
regions and focuses on conduct that warrants criminal 
condemnation.”119 The “manifest threshold,” indicates that clearly not 
all aggression will fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and thus the 
threshold will filter out borderline cases.120 The “manifest violation” 
qualifier should, in other words, be interpreted to exclude uses of force 
                                                     
113 For more on the reasonableness standard in an international criminal 
law context, see Jessica Liang, Defending the Emergence of the 
Superior Orders in the Contemporary Context,2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L 
L. 871-891, 884 (2010). 
114 Id. 
115 The crime of aggression, RC/RES.6, Annex II, intro. ¶ 3 (June 11, 
2010).  
116 VCLT, supra note 9, at art 31.  
117 ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, 139 (Oxford University Press 3rd ed., 2013).   
118 Id. 
119 Id.; See also February 2009: Final Meeting of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression Meeting, in THE PRINCETON 
PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL 
WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009, 51 
(Stefan Barriga, et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE PRINCETON 
PROCESS]. 
120 Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1, at ¶19 
(5 Sept. 2006). 
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from the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction, which facially violate the 
UN Charter, but nonetheless comport with its principles and purposes. 
The reader need not yet be convinced. Even if humanitarian 
intervention is a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and even if 
humanitarian intervention is a “manifest violation” of the Charter, it is 
still not necessarily the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. 
This is because Article 8 bis further qualifies “manifest” by requiring 
the act of aggression to have a “character, gravity and scale” which 
makes it a manifest violation.121 These parameters are specific and set a 
high threshold for individual criminal culpability.122 Specifically, it is 
not any manifest violation, but only violations which are manifest 
because of their “character, gravity and scale123” that are crimes of 
aggression under the Rome Statute. Thus, to determine whether an 
aggressive act is both a “manifest violation” and criminal, one must 
first define these other qualifiers and apply them accordingly. As we 
will see, a reasonable interpretation of these qualifiers will exclude 
humanitarian interventions. 
 
Before interpreting the qualifiers, the issue of which 
combination of the qualifiers need be satisfied must first be addressed. 
At Kampala, Understanding No. 7, intended to aid the Court in 
interpreting Article 8 bis, was adopted by resolution.124 Understanding 
No. 7 provides that, [i]n establishing whether an act of aggression 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient 
to justify a 'manifest' determination. “No one component can be 
significant enough” to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.125 This 
Understanding reflects the view that prosecutions at the ICC for the 
crime of aggression will be confined to only the most serious and 
dangerous armed interventions. Yet Understanding No. 7 also adds a 
degree of confusion.126 A plain, “strictly grammatical reading” of 
                                                     
121 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8(1). 
122 See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136. 
123 Rome Statute, supra note 3 at art. 8(1). 
124 See generally David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression 
Under the Rome Statute, 43 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 173, 179 
(2011). 
125 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Annex III; See also BARRIGA, supra 
note 89, at 629. 
126 See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 728 (suggesting that the new Rome 
Statute provision “actually might have been more easily interpreted 
without [the Understandings]”). 
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Article 8 bis(1) would require all three qualifiers to be satisfied.127 The 
qualifiers are written conjunctively. Understanding No. 7, however, 
suggests only two metrics need to be met. Rather than limit Article 8 
bis as the United States intended, Understanding No. 7 may actually 
expand it.128 Further, the Understanding erroneously refers to an act of 
aggression, but Article 8 bis(2)—defining acts of aggression—does not 
require any determination of “manifest violation” or of satisfaction of 
the three qualifiers. Those requirements deal with the crime of 
aggression and are contained in Article 8 bis(1), where, as Schafer 
notes, “there already exists the triple-hitter standard of ‘character, 
gravity, and scale’ . . . .”129 Simply, Understanding No. 7 refers to the 
wrong section of Article 8.  
 
The Court could simply disregard Understanding No. 7 as 
being patently erroneous. Elsewhere, however, the ICC has read “and” 
in the Rome Statute to mean “or” and could do so again even if it 
disregards the Understanding.130 Regardless of whether the Court will 
read Article 8 bis as requiring all three metrics to be satisfied or just 
some combination of two, humanitarian intervention should be 
excluded from the crime of aggression.131 The most logical 
interpretation of both character and gravity will exclude humanitarian 




                                                     
127 Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179. 
128 Scheffer concludes that it is doubtful that the ICC judges will create 
any such magnitude standard anyway based on the erroneous 
formulation of Understanding No. 7. The simple fact is, “the Rome 
Statute, as amended, requires no such determination for ‘acts of 
aggression,’” but only for the crime of aggression. See id. at 180; See 
also, Heinsch, supra note 3, at 729. 
129 Scheffer, supra note 124, at 179. 
130 For example, article 30 of the Rome Statute states that “Unless 
otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if 
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.” 
(emphasis added) There is little doubt that the Court interprets this 
“and” as “or.” Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 30. 
131 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 484. 
132 See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 95, at 1120. 





Resolution 3314 does not use the term “character” to 
differentiate between acts of aggression or crimes of aggression, nor for 
any other purpose.133. “Character” is not defined in Article 8 bis. 
Consequently, Paulus has suggested that the term is so indeterminate as 
to be “almost meaningless.”134 This author respectfully disagrees. As 
one of three qualifiers it is self-evident that “character” must mean 
something other than “gravity” and “scale”. The term suggests a 
qualitative analysis as opposed to quantitative.135 A good faith 
interpretation of the “character” qualifier will exempt uses of force that 
may be found to be technical acts of aggression or unlawful uses of 
force, but which are executed for laudable motives. This qualifier could 
be the acid test for distinguishing between bona fide unilateral 
humanitarian intervention and criminal aggression masquerading as 
humanitarianism.   
 
The “character” qualifier provides an opportunity for the 
Court to apply the crime of aggression flexibly enough to exclude bona 
fide but unauthorized humanitarian intervention. The relevant character 
of an act of aggression should be construed as its motive. In other 
words, the motive of humanitarian intervention affects the character of 
aggression. As Van Schaack notes, the term “character” is “elastic” and 
provides “an opening to argue that an act of aggression was not 
committed with hostile intent or for aggressive purposes.”136 The 
German delegation to the Preparatory Committee highlighted the 
relevance of intent.137 The importance of intent in aggression has been 
recognized by scholars.138 Glaser, for example, argues that there must 
                                                     
133 See Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486. 
134 Paulus, supra note 95, at 1121. 
135 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486. 
136 Id. 
137 Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Court, 
Proposals for Definition of the War Crime Aggression, 5th Sess., 
Dec.1-12, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997 (Dec. 11, 1997). 
138 See, e.g., Elise Leclerc-Gagné & Michael Byers, A Question of 
Intent: The Crime of Aggression and Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 381 (2009); Michael P. 
Scharf et al., Rep. of Cleveland Experts Meeting: The Int’l Criminal 
Court and the Crime of Aggression 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 436 
(2009) (citing reports of the Spec. Comm. in U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/7185/Rev. 1 (1968)); U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 
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be a special intent (an aggressive purpose) for the crime of aggression 
to attach in customary international law.139 Under this view, a military 
incursion for the sole purpose of humanitarian intervention would not 
constitute aggression.140 Cassese initially disagreed and argued that 
customary international law prohibits aggression regardless of motive, 
but later changed his view to agree with Glaser.141 Although a specific 
intent is not explicitly provided for in the definition of the crime in 
Article 8 bis, a specific intent element is arguably implicated by the 
“character” qualifier. Reaching the same result by a different 
interpretive technique, Gillett suggests “the aggression provisions could 
be read to import an implicit negative element, whereby the 
Prosecution must prove the absence of a legal justification for the use 
of armed force.”142 In other words, the Court could shift the burden to 
the prosecution.143  
 
If the Court interprets “character” differently, motive could 
still be raised as a defense once the Court has determined it has 
jurisdiction over humanitarian interventions. The Court is empowered 
with the ability to entertain a defense of motive, for example, as part of 
a defense based on lack of mens rea. Article 31(3) of the Rome Statute 
provides that “At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility other than those [specifically provided for in the 
Rome Statute] where such a ground is derived from [international] 
law.”144 Motive can play a role in international crimes.145 This provision 
of the Rome Statute “opens the possibility of uncodified defenses being 
                                                                                                          
20, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (Feb. 14, 1970); U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. 
No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8019 (July 13–Aug. 14, 1970); U.N. GAOR, 26th 
Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8419 (Feb. 1-Mar. 5, 1971); U.N. 
GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/8719 (Jan. 31–Mar. 3, 
1972). 
139 Jens Ohlin, Aggression, in The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice 238 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (referencing Antonio Cassese, On some Problematical Aspects of 
the Crime of Aggression, 20 LJIL (2007) 841-849). 
142 Gillett, supra note 2, at 847. 
143 See id. 
144 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 31(3). 
145 See, e.g., Paul Behrens, Genocide and the Question of Motives, 10 J. 
INT. CRIM. JUST., July 2012, at 501, 23. 
 Journal of International Law  
90 
 
considered by the Court.”146 It is to be read broadly. As Eser notes, 
“defenses” denote “all grounds which, for one reason or another, hinder 
the sanctioning of an offence – despite the fact that the offence has 
fulfilled all definitional elements of a crime.”147 Schabas concludes that 
Article 31(1) “provides the Court with a relatively free hand to consider 
other defenses, to the extent that they have some basis in the sources of 
applicable law,” so long as the provision’s procedural rules are 
complied with.148 Such a ground could be a motive related to a use of 




A threshold requirement is not something new to international 
criminal law, or even to the Rome Statute.150 Crimes against humanity 
and war crimes both contain threshold requirements. Crimes against 
humanity must be “widespread and systematic.”151 War crimes must 
constitute a “serious infringement.”152 Similarly, the Geneva 
Conventions contain the “grave breaches” standard for criminal 
responsibility.153 Both Resolution 3314 and the UN Charter envision a 
                                                     
146 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 484 (Oxford University Press 
2010). 
147 Id. at 484 (quoting Albin Eser, Defenses’ in War Crimes Trials, in 
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 251, 251 (Yoram Dinstein and 
Mala Tabory eds., 1996).).  
148 Id. at 492 (discussing the procedures relating to Rule 80 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence in accordance with article 31(3)). 
149 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 31(3). Article 31(3) allows the 
Court to exclude criminal responsibility if the conduct is permissible 
under applicable law. That applicable law could be R2P. 
150 See generally Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity 
Threshold of the International Criminal Court, 23 AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY INT’L. LAW REV. 807, 807 (2008). 
151 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.  
152 Id. art. 8.  
153 See Heinsch, supra note 3, at 727 (noting that “not all violations of 
international humanitarian law entail individual criminal responsibility 
but only those listed in the respective articles of the Geneva 
Conventions or Additional protocol I”); see also Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
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“continuum of unlawful uses of force, only some of which rise to the 
level of aggression.”154 Resolution 3314 provides a further example in 
this respect: in order to determine whether a sanctionable act of 
aggression has occurred, the Security Council may “conclude that such 
a determination would not be justified in the light of other relevant 
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their 
consequences are not of sufficient gravity.”155 “Gravity” as a threshold 
matter represents nothing new.  
 
This qualifier could be read either as a quantitative measure of 
the kinetic potency of the use of force, or as qualitative consideration of 
the seriousness of a legal infraction.156 Van Schaack suggests it is the 
former.157 She writes that “gravity” refers to the “severity, magnitude, 
and consequences of a particular use of force.”158 That is how the World 
Court has used the term. The “gravity” metric traces its roots to dicta 
from the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment (and the Oil Platforms case).159 In 
Nicaragua, the ICJ alluded to “measures which do not constitute an 
armed attack but may nevertheless involve a use of force.”160 The ICJ 
found it “necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of 
force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave 
forms.”161 The World Court further explained that an armed attack 
                                                                                                          
Condition of the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; See also Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135; See also Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287; See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 art. 85, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
154 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 483. 
155 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, art. 2. 
156 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 486 (for a suggestion that 
consequences are qualitative). 
157 Id. 
158 Id.  
159 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 195, 247, 249, (Nov. 26); Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 62, 72 
(Nov. 6); See also DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136. 
160 Nicar., supra note 159, at ¶ 210; see also, DINSTEIN, supra note 
16, at 208. 
161 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 208. 
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differed from “a mere frontier incident,” inasmuch as an armed attack 
must have sufficient “scale and effects.”162 Similarly, in determining the 
scope of “gravity,” the office of the prosecutor, which at the time was 
directed by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, reasoned that several factors must 
be considered: “the number of persons killed, number of victims of 
other crimes, especially crimes against physical integrity and the 
impact of the crimes.”163 “Gravity” in this sense is a quantitative metric 
of the scale of force employed, and therefore incorporates the 
distinction of acts of aggression that warrant close international 
scrutiny from less significant uses of force.  
 
This is arguably not the correct application of the gravity 
qualifier in Article 8 bis. Quantitative measurements are already 
captured by the scale metric, which is discussed below. In fact, the ICJ 
used the same terminology (“systematic” and “large scale”) to explain 
“scale” in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Application for Warrants of Arrest).164 Logically, “gravity” here must 
                                                     
162 Id. at 210. (Dinstein points out that “The assumption that ‘a mere 
frontier incident’ can have no ‘scale and effects’ is quite bothersome.) 
163 LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO, INFORMAL MEETING OF LEGAL 
ADVISORS OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 6 (2005), 
available at 
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/speeches/LM
O_20051024_English.pdf. (Although it is arguably not the Prosecutor’s 
prerogative to be interpreting the Rome Statute the Pre-Trial chamber 
in Lubanga did limit the scope of “gravity” by requiring the conduct to 
be either “systematic” or “large scale.” Pre Trial Chamber, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 29, January 
2007 at 46). 
164 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Application for Warrants of 
Arrest, ¶ 64 (Feb. 10, 2006); but see Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Appeal of Case No. 
ICC-01/04-125-Us-Exp, ¶ 82 (July 13, 2006) (noting that this definition 
of gravity is flawed, albeit in obiter dicta); see also MORENO-
OCAMPO, supra note 163, at 6 (stating, “We are currently in the 
process of refining our methodologies for assessing gravity. In 
particular, there are several factors that must be considered. The most 
obvious of these is the number of persons killed – as this tends to be the 
most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our 
investigations to situations where killing has been the predominant 
crime. We also look at number of victims of other crimes, especially 
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mean something different than systematic, widespread, or large scale. 
Interpreting Article 8 bis to exclude legal grey areas or de minimus 
infractions of the UN Charter would be in conformity with a number of 
provisions of the Rome Statue. Article 5(1), for example, provides that 
“[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”165 The 
Preamble has a similar provision.166 This reflects the language of 
Resolution 3314, which provides that aggression is “the most serious 
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force.”167 Echoing this, the U.S. 
was successful in obtaining the following Understanding at Kampala:  
 
It is understood that aggression is the most serious 
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and 
that a determination whether an act of aggression has 
been committed requires consideration of all the 
circumstances of each particular case, including the 
gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.168 
 
By signaling out “gravity” the Understanding seems to elevate its 
significance above character and scale. 
 
The “gravity” metric should be used, therefore, as an analysis 
of the degree to which a use of force is unlawful. If humanitarian 
interventions are deemed violative of the UN Charter, the question 
                                                                                                          
crimes against physical integrity. The impact of the crimes is another 
important factor.”). 
165 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at pmbl. (“Affirming that the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished…”); see also id. art. 66(3) (which requires the 
Court to be “convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable 
doubt.”). 
166 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 1. 
167 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 36, at pmbl.; see also Van Schaack, 
supra note 7, at 484. 
168 THE PRINCETON PRESS, supra note 119, at 8; Resolution 
RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, 13th plenary meeting, June, 11, 
2010; Resolution RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression, 13th plenary 
meeting, June 11, 2010; see Resolution RC/Res.6, June 28, 
2010, Annex III, ¶ 7; see Depositary Notification, Nov. 29, 2010, 
C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8; see generally Van der Vyver, supra note 92. 
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becomes: how grave is the violation? This interpretation of gravity—
the seriousness of a legal breach—is how it is used elsewhere in the 
Rome Statute. Article 17(d) requires the Pre-trial Chamber, when 
assessing admissibility of a case, to ensure that those before the Court 
are of “sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court.”169 The 
prosecutor is also required to make such a determination before 
initiating investigations.170 Although reading article 17(d) and the 
“gravity” metric together could appear to create a redundancy, this is 
not the case. There are two separate gravity tests here, but that does not 
militate in construing “gravity” in Article 8 bis any differently than as it 
is used in Article 17(d). The tests are not duplicative. The “gravity” of 
the use of force, measured to determine if the crime of aggression is 
punishable, is higher than the gravity of the situation necessary to 
warrant the Court’s attention and resources as a general matter. A 
corollary of this is that the gravity test cannot be lower than the Court’s 
general threshold for hearing only highly important cases, and it cannot 
be the same standard. The “gravity” qualifier should be employed to 
exclude the malum prohibitum infractions of the UN Charter, which are 




The scale metric is quantitative. It can also be traced to the 
Nicaragua case, where, as noted above, the ICJ held that a use of force 
must have some “scale and effects” to constitute an armed attack for 
the purposes of the UN Charter.171 Dinstein notes that there is “no doubt 
that minor acts of aggression – even if enumerated in Paragraph 2 [of 8 
bis] – would not pass muster as crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”172 In other words, the acts may be patently unlawful, but they 
are qualitatively insignificant enough to (judicially) ignore. There is 
                                                     
169 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17 (Clearly, the question is whether 
the case is important enough to warrant the Court’s attention. After 
all, a nuclear detonation which violates a crime will be important 
enough for the Court’s attention even though it is a one-time event 
and not widespread.).  
170 Id. at art. 53. 
171See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 
Merits, Judgments (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 92 (June 27); see 
DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 210 (noting that “[t]he assumption that ‘a 
mere frontier incident’ can have no ‘scale and effects’ is quite 
bothersome”). 
172 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 136. 
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sufficient authority to confidently posit that relatively minor uses of 
force—for example, a warning shot across the bow of a ship or the 
rescue of nationals abroad from airplane hijackers—do not even violate 
Article 2(4).173 The “scale” metric recognizes this and makes its 
satisfaction an explicit requirement for an act of aggression to be a 
crime under the Rome Statute. Any humanitarian intervention 
substantial enough to curb atrocities will probably be of a “scale” 
sufficient to trigger this metric.174 This qualifier will not exclude 
humanitarian interventions but it is important, again, to note that both 
“gravity” and “scale” cannot be read to mean the same thing. “Scale” 
clearly refers to the level of force used, either in an individual armed 
attack or in aggregate, and so gravity must mean something different: 
an analysis how significantly a use of force is a violation of the UN 
Charter. 
 
IV. NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE 
 
Following the adoption of the ICC’s definition of the crime of 
aggression, the New York Times ran an editorial that posited, “What 
constitutes a ‘manifest’ violation of the charter?  The truth is it’s 
impossible to say.”175 The Times editorial is at least partially correct, 
                                                     
173 Id. (referencing, MARY E. O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND 
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 229-230 (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). O’Connell and Niyazmatov suggest “there is 
sufficient authority to conclude that ‘minor’ uses of force, including 
rescue of nationals involving minor force, are not even violations of 
Article 2(4), let alone serious violations amounting to aggression.” 
They point out that: “State practice and decisions of the ICJ indicate 
that some inter-state uses of force might violate the 
principle of non-intervention or constitute unlawful countermeasures 
but do not come within the prohibition of Art. 2(4). Police-type 
operations used to arrest pirates, to stop a vessel by shooting across 
the bow, or to rescue hostages, for example, may involve the use of 
force but are treated as too minimal to come within Art. 2(4). Art. 2(4) 
prohibits armed force of more than a minor or de minimis nature . . . 
As discussed above, if a use of force does not violate Art. 2(4), it is not 
aggression. Even a violation of Art. 2(4) will not constitute aggression 
if it is too minor. Aggression is a serious violation of Art. 2(4).” 
174 Barriga, supra note 89, at 629. 
175 Michael J. Glennon, Op-Ed., The Vague New Crime of ‘Aggression’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2010), 
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and ultimately we won’t know the meaning of “manifest” or “character, 
gravity, and scale” until the judges at the ICC tell us what they mean. 
After all, only they can interpret the Rome Statute.176 Murphy has 
criticized the ICC’s aggression definition because it provides no real 
guideposts for what the qualifiers require.177 Hence, the Rome Statute 
suffers “from considerable indeterminacy on a central issue.”178 It 
would seem that in selecting such an ambiguous term, the drafters of 
Article 8 bis have vested the judges at the Court with broad discretion 
in interpreting the crime of aggression. But their discretion is not 
unfettered. If and when they do interpret the definition of the crime of 
aggression, they will be bound by the rule of nullum crimen sine lege.179 
This is “a fundamental principle of justice that applies to all criminal 
law systems, [and] requires that the penal law be clear and easily 
ascertained, and thus provide adequate notice to individuals that certain 
conduct may result in criminal liability.”180 As Schabas notes, the 
“canon of strict construction of penal law is a corollary of the principle 
of legality. Ambiguity or doubt is to be resolved in favor of the 
accused: in dubio pro reo.”181 The nullum crimen sine lege principle 
was codified in the Rome Statute in order to “reassure States as to the 
moderation with which the Court will interpret its Statute.”182 Pursuant 
to Article 22(2), “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed,” 
and “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”183  
                                                                                                          
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/opinion/06ihtedglennon.html?_r=
0. 
176 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21. Implicit here is the notion 
that only the judges on the ICC can interpret provisions of the Rome 
Statute. 
177 Sean D. Murphy, Aggression, Legitimacy, and the International 
Criminal Court, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1151 (2010). 
178 Id. 
179 See generally THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH, SELECTED SPEECHES 28, 
110 (Oxford, 2011) (noting that nullum crimen sine lege translates to 
English as “no crime without law”).  
180 SLYE AND VAN SCHAACK, supra note 48, at 85.  
181 SCHABAS, supra note 140, at 410 (referring to Rome Statute article 
22(2)). 
182 Id. at 723. 
183 Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 22(2); DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 
140. See generally COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 
98; Pre-Trial Chamber II used this canon of interpretation in Bemba 




Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute will apply to Article 8 bis, 
and the qualifiers must be interpreted accordingly.184 Answering what 
activity would be a manifest violation in terms of Article 8 bis at this 
point is speculative, and therefore works in favor of a narrow reading—
one which excludes humanitarian interventions. Dinstein notes that “the 
penumbra of uncertainty, which is characteristic of some segments of 
the contemporary jus ad bellum, should not be exaggerated.”185 Shaw 
similarly suggests “the right of individual states to intervene by force in 
the territory of other states” pursuant to R2P and humanitarian 
intervention is ambiguous.186  The adjective ambiguous is an antonym 
of manifest.187 It follows then that even if an aggressive act purporting 
in good faith to be lawful as a matter of R2P or humanitarian 
intervention violates the UN Charter, it is by Shaw’s use of 
terminology, not going to be a manifestly clear violation sufficient to 




This article has shown that bona fide humanitarian 
intervention is not per se prohibited by the UN Charter, and therefore 
will not necessarily be a violation of Article 2(4). That is not to say that 
humanitarian intervention is affirmatively authorized, but rather ultra 
vires. This is all that must be shown. Even if humanitarian intervention 
is found to facially violate the UN Charter, however, it will not be a 
manifest violation because bona fide humanitarian intervention 
comports with the Charter’s principles. Even if it is found to be a 
manifest violation, however, a humanitarian intervention will not have 
the specific character and gravity necessary to be the punishable under 
Article 8 bis. This is so regardless of whether the Court interprets the 
qualifiers disjunctively or conjunctively (as shown above, both 
character and gravity can be understood to exclude humanitarian 
                                                                                                          
Gombo, when it construed Article 30’s dolus eventualis (recklessness) 
exclusion. Id. at 410, (referencing Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/09), 
Decision Pursuant to Article 71(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 
369). 
184 See COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 95, at 410. 
185 DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 148. 
186 SHAW, supra note 71, at 1158 (emphasis added). 
187 Thesauraus.com, http://thesaurus.com/browse/manifest (search 
antonyms “manifest”).  
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interventions). Under each of these arguments, the Court lacks 
jurisdiction to punish an individual for the crime of aggression. The 
Court need only accept one of these arguments for its jurisdiction to 
fail. 
  
To some extent, the debate on the crime of aggression is 
largely academic. The Court still does not have the power to try this 
crime and may not for a long time.188 But the power of Article 8 bis lays 
in its ability to create the normative assumption that humanitarian 
intervention is not lawful, but criminal. If bona fide humanitarian 
intervention used as a last resort to protect fundamental human rights is 
deemed criminal, it would, as Simma puts it, create a split “between 
law and morality.”189 Even while arguing that humanitarian intervention 
is not provided for in customary international law, Simma notes that 
“[i]t becomes more and more intolerable to see grave violations of 
human rights within a State and to see other States being banned by 
public international law from intervening . . .”190  
 
It would be self-immolating to construe the Rome Statute in 
such a way that it undermines human rights by chilling humanitarian 
intervention. In interpreting the Rome Statute, the judges at the ICC 
would be wise to heed the admonishment leveled at young medical 
students to “first, do no harm.”191 Van Schaack is correct when she says 
that a broad interpretation of Article 8 bis “may result in more ex post 
prosecutions of leaders launching aggressive campaigns at the expense 
of ex ante efforts to halt threatened or ongoing violence.”192 Without an 
interpretation of the crime of aggression that excludes humanitarian 
intervention, there exists a potential to “chill arguably beneficent uses 
of force.”193 Because bona fide humanitarian intervention advances few 
                                                     
188 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
189 SIMMA, supra note 12, at 131-132. 
190 Id.  
191 See generally FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND 
HEALTHCARE (Sheila A. M. McLean ed., 2006) (examining patients’ 
rights and medical practitioners’ duties in observance of those rights, 
balanced by a duty to meet statutory requirements in the medical field).  
192 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 482 (citing Kenneth Anderson, The 
Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 333 (2009)) (noting how 
international criminal law has emerged as an alternative to 
intervention). 
193 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 487-488. 
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or only abstract national interests for the intervening state, they are the 
most likely forms of force to be chilled. Already states are not 
“chomping at the bit to intervene in support of human rights.”194 Lest 
we forget, “even in the face of a horrific genocide, the international 
community found a host of excuses for not intervening more robustly 
in Rwanda. The codification of a crime of aggression without any 
humanitarian exception provides one more excuse for inaction in the 
face of atrocities.”195 When the law protects states engaging in massive 
human rights abuses by criminalizing what may be the only remedy 
available, the law has failed. Fortunately, as has been shown, it is 
perfectly possible to interpret the UN Charter so as not to prohibit 
humanitarian intervention, and for Article 8 bis not to criminalize it. A 
contrary interpretation of these provisions would only strengthen the 
hand of states engaging in massive human rights violations and would 
undermine the very principles the ICC and the UN system seek to 
uphold. 
  
                                                     
194 MICHAEL BYERS & SIMON CHESTERMAN, Changing the 
Rules About the Rules?Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, 
supra note 12, at 177, 202. 
195 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 488. 
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